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Bissonnette: Public Officials and Employees - The Common-Law Rule against Hold

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES-The Common-Law Rule Against Holding
Incompatible Offices-Abolishing the "Office" Limitation. Haskins v.
State, ex rel. Harrington, 516 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1973).

On May 27, 1970, the Wyoming Attorney General rendered an opinion which held that a teacher could properly
serve on the board of trustees in his school district.' In reliance upon that opinion, Ray Haskins, a teacher in the Park
County School District, ran for a seat on the board of trustees in that district. He was elected and on June 30, 1971,
qualified as a member of the board. On December 11, 1973,
the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed a district court decision that found Haskins' office as board member to be
incompatible with his position as a teacher.'
The explanation for this unusual sequence of events must
lie in the fact that in Haskins v. State, ex rel. Harrington,'
the Wyoming Supreme Court unexpectedly departed from
the traditional statement and application of the common-law
rule" against holding incompatible offices. -Under the common-law rule, an official can not accept a second office incompatible with the first. The rule is strictly limited to situations involving two "offices." 5 The court in Haskins held
that, in accord with the purpose of the rule, and in light of
the facts of this particular case, the rule was to be applied
here in spite of the fact that teachers are not recognized as
holders of an "office."'
After a brief examination of the common-law rule against
holding incompatible offices, the reasoning of the court in
Haskins will be developed, and an observation will be made
on the proper role of the legislature in this area.
CoMMoN-LAW INCOM:PATMMTY

The common-law rule on incompatible offices is based
on the policy that the public deserves to be represented by
men of independent judgment," who have not hindered their
Copyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming

1. 13 OP. WYo. ATTY. GEN. 68 (1970).
2. Haskins v. State, ex reL. Harrington, 516 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1973) (hereinafter cited as Haskins).
3. Id.
4. See text infra pp. 671-73.
5. See text infra p. 669.
6. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1175-78.
7. See Haskins, supra note 2, at 1179; Jones v. MacDonald, 33 N.J. 132, 162
A.2d 817, 818 (1960); and 3 E. McQuILuN, MUNICIrAL CORpoRATioNS
§ 12.67, at 295-96 (3d ed. 1973).
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ability to serve by accepting two or more inconsistent offices.
The rule is such that if an officer accepts another office, incompatible with the first, he has thereby automatically vacated the first office.! The element of incompatibility lies
in the conflict of duties or functions of the offices :?
Where such duties and functions are inherently inconsistent and repugnant, so that because of the contrariety and antagonism which would result from
the attempt of one person to discharge faithfully,
impartially, and efficiently the duties of both offices, considerations of public policy render it improper for an incumbent to retain both."
Determination of whether incompatibility exists in a
given case is usually bound with broad statements of public
policy, as the courts thus far have tended to avoid formulation of specific standards of incompatibility." Many decisions, however, have been based on the fact that one of the
offices was subordinate to the other, in that matters involving
salary, tenure and promotion, were decided by the superior
officer in regards to himself and associates, as subordinate
officers." If such subordination is found to exist between
the offices, incompatibility is likely to be found. The rule
against holding incompatible offices, however, is not limited
by the concept of subordination. Incompatibility can also
exist where a man holds two offices which are independent
8. F. MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICERS § 420, at 267-68 (1890) (hereinafter cited
as MECHEM).
9. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1180; Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 860,
370 (1960); Jones v. Kolbeck, 119 N.J. Super. 299, 291 A.2d 378, 379 (1972).
It will be pointed out later in this note that there is a distinction between
conflicts of "duties" and conflicts of "interest." See text infra pp.
10. 63 AM. JuR. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 73 (1972). See 3 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.67, at 297 (3d ed. 1973).
In § 12.67(a), McQuillin lists many pairs of offices which have been held
to be incompatible, including: mayor and councilman, mayor and city manager, councilman and county supervisor, alderman and commissioner of
improvement district, city treasurer and member of the board of education, and justice of the peace and sheriff.
In § 12.67(b) he lists some offices held not incompatible, including: court
clerks and member of the legislature, mayor and justice of the peace,
mayor and district attorney, and member of the board of education and
sheriff.
11. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 632 (1963).
12. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1178; See, e.g., Jones v. MacDonald, supra note
7, at 819; Kaufman v. Pannaccio, 121 N.J. Super. 27, 295, A.2d 639, 641
(1972); and Linman and Alfton, Municipal Officials in PRACTICAL MUNICIPAL LAW § 2.07, at 49 (E. Wright ed. 1972) (hereinafter cited as WmGHT).
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of each other's supervision, but which are related to each
other in a way that results in the biased or haphazard execution of an office. Such would be the case where a city judge
was appointed city attorney."3 The judge could not be expected to exercise his normally independent judgment in a
case where he was counsel for the city.
Incompatibility is not found where the duties of the
offices are the same, or where the holding of one office assists the officer in fulfilling the duties of the other. 4
The limits of the common-law rule against holding incompatible offices are particularly important in one's analysis of Haskins.5 As traditionally stated, the rule only applies
to incompatible "offices," and the courts have refrained
from applying the rule in cases involving only one "office"
and an incompatible "position" or "employment."' 6 The
distinction between an "office" and a "position" is often
based on hyper-technicalities,"' and the distinction has therefore been criticized as an artificial limit to the rule against
incompatible offices.' Despite the criticism, the distinction
has continued to limit the rule, perhaps because of the problematic uncertainty that would result if the limitation were
abolished.'
Mention should be made here of the dual-office holding
statutes, which are closely related to the rule against holding
incompatible offices. "Dual-office holding" is a term associated with a variety of statutes which forbid the holding of
two or more specifically named offices. Some of these, such
13. People, on Complaint of Chapman, v. Rapsey, 96 P.2d 1000 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1939).
14. 68 AM. Jua. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 78 (1972).
15. Haskins, supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., Baker v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Crook County, 9 WYO. 51, 54, 59 P. 797,
797-98 (1900); and Wilentz, Atty. Gen., ex rel. Golat, v. Stanger, 129 N.J.L.
606, 80 A.2d 885, 889 (NJ. Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
Although a few special types of litigation require a three-way distinction
among "office," "position," and "employment," incompatibility cases only
require that "office" be distinguished from everything else, which may be
called "position" or "employment," interchangeably. Glasser, A New Jersey Municipal Law Mystery: What is a "Public Office?", 6 RUTrERS L.
REv. 503, 507-10 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Glasser).
17. See Main v. Claremont Unified School Dist., 326 P.2d 578 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958).
18. See Haskins, supra note 2, at 1178; and Glasser, supra note 16, at 504.
19. See text infra pp. 672-73.
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as Wyo. STAT. § 5-75,"° are based on the same policy as the
rule against incompatible offices. Others2 are based on similar policies, such as the policy that offices should not be allowed to collect in the hands of a few men, or the policy that
the separation of powers doctrine should extend down to the
individual office-holder.22 These dual-office holding statutes
supersede the common-law rule against holding incompatible
offices with respect to the specific offices with which the
statutes deal. The courts in most jurisdictions, including
Wyoming, 3 have recognized the legislature as the ultimate
creator of standards and qualifications for elections. 4
Of particular importance to this analysis of the Haskins
case is the conflict of interest concept. Conflict of interest
is concerned with the misuse of a public office by one who is
engaged in self-dealing. A conflict of interest involves personal or pecuniary gain to the office-holder,26 as opposed to
the more general injury to the public caused by the holding
of incompatible offices. 7 Under the common-law rule, if
any officer or employee of the governmental unit has an
interest in a government contract, that contract is declared
void.'" Wyoming has two statutes which deal with conflict
of interest. WYo. STAT. § 6-1782" provides a criminal penalty
20. WYO. STAT. § 5-75 (1957). "The office of district court commissioner and
clerk of the district court are hereby declared to be incompatible . .. ."
21. Other Wyoming dual-office holding statutes include: WYO. CONST. art. 3,
§ 8, dealing with restrictions on state legislators; WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 9,
dealing with restrictions on congressmen and other federal officeholders;
and Wyo. STAT. § 18-98 (1957), dealing with county assessors.
22. 63 AM. JuR. 2d Public Officers and Employees §§ 63-72 (1972).
23. See Haskins, supra note 2, at 1179.
24. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ozzard, supra note 9, at 363-66; People, on Complaint
of Chapman, v. Rapsey, supra note 13, at 1002-03; and Childs v. Moses, 178
Misc. 828, 36 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
25. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1179; Reilly v. Ozzard, supra note 9, at 368-70.
See generally Eisenberg, Conflicts of Interest Situations and Remedies, 13
RUTcERs L. REV. 666 (1959).
26. Quackenbush v. City of Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 155, 70 P.2d 577, 579 (1937);
WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 47-48.
27. Haskins, supra note 2 ,at 1179.
28. See, e.g., City of Lincoln v. First Natl Bank of Lincoln, 146 Neb. 221, 19
N.W.2d 156, 160 (1945).
29. WYO. STAT. § 6-178 (Supp. 1973).
(a) Any state officer, county commissioner, trustee of any school
district, mayor . . . who shall . . . be interested, directly or in-

directly, in any contract for the construction of any state building,
courthouse, schoolhouse , . . or work of any kind . . .; or who shall

bargain for or receive any percentage, drawback, premiums, or
profits, or money whatever on any contract . . shall be fined not
more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) nor less than one
hundred dollars ($100.00).
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for having an interest in construction contracts, and Wyo.
STAT. § 9-680"° allows the common-law remedy for a conflict
of interest involving any other government contract. Both
of these statutes were amended in 1969 to provide exceptions
where the interested party disclosed his interest and refrained
from participating in the consideration of the matter." As
will be seen shortly, these statutes were directly involved in
Haskins v. State, ex rel. Harrington. 2
WYOIING'S DIVERGENCE FROM THE COMMON-LAW

RULE

The relators in Haskins were members of the board of
trustees for Park County School District. They filed a complaint in the district court in quo warranto, alleging that
common-law incompatibility existed as a result of a teacher
being elected to the board. Haskins argued that he had a
constitutional right to hold office, 3 and, alternatively, that
he had satisfied the disclosure requirements of Wyo. STAT.
§§ 6-178 and 9-680, which he felt had abrogated the commonlaw rule on incompatibility. 4 Both parties moved for summary
judgment. Judgment was rendered against Haskins and he
was thereby ordered to give up the board seat. 5 A stay of
the order was procured pending appeal.
(b) [Ihf any such officer .. .shall be interested as aforesaid
in such contract, but shall disclose the nature and extent thereof
to all the contracting parties concerned therewith and shall absent
himself during the considerations and vote thereon . .. then the
said acts shall not be unlawful.
30. WYo. STAT. § 9-680 (Supp. 1973). (a) It shall not be lawful for any
person ... holding any office . . . to become in any manner interested ...
in any contract . . . in the making or letting of which such officer may be
called upon to act or vote. . . . [A]ny and all contracts made and procured in violation hereof, shall be null and void. Subsection (b) provides
for the same disclosure exception as subsection (b) of WYo. STAT. § 6-178
(Supp. 1973). See note 29 supra.
31. Ch. 158, §§ 1-3 [1969] Wyo. SESS. LAWS 336.
32. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1178-79.
33. Id. at 1172. This argument was made under the equal rights provisions
of WYo. CONST. art. 1, and the equal protection and due process clauses
of the 14th amendment to the U.S. CONST.
34. Haskins, supra note 2, at 1172. This argument was founded upon the incorrect assertion by the Wyoming Attorney General that the statutes had
abrogated the rule against holding incompatible offices. See 13 Or. WYO.
ATrY. GEN. 68 (1970).
35. Although the rule usually operates to vacate the first office, that of teacher
here, there is a recognized exception at common law where the officer is
unable to resign the first office, because of a contract obligation, MECHEM, supra note 8, § 421 at 268; 22 R.C.L. § 63 at 418-19 (1918).
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On appeal before the Wyoming Supreme Court, Haskins
made three arguments ?
1) that he had a constitutional right to run for and hold
office;
2) that the common-law rule against holding incompatible offices had been abrogated by statute; and
3) that the common-law rule did not apply here because
of the "office" limitation.
On the first argument, the court held that the individual's right to hold office was subordinate to any compelling
public interest, and that the rule on incompatibility thus
could not be deemed an unconstitutional infringement of
Haskins' rights."
The second argument failed because, as pointed out earconflict of interest deals with a different problem
than the rule on incompatibility. Statutes dealing with conflict of interest certainly cannot have any determinative effect on the common-law rule against incompatibility.
lier,"8

Haskin's third argument was based on the "office" limitation of the common-law rule. This argument should have
warranted a reversal, because teachers are not considered to
be officers. 9 The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, wanted
to reach a different result. Crediting the common law with
remarkable flexibility," the court held that, in accord with
the purpose of the rule, the technical "office" limitation
would not be allowed to stop the court from acting in a situation like this where public policy demanded that the rule be
applied.4 ' The court here was clearly reaching for a result,
as it simultaneously expanded the common-law rule beyond
its traditional limits, and contracted the expanded version
so that it only applied to the teacher-trustee situation. In
rendering this narrow holding, the court did not foreclose
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Haskins, supra note 2, at 1173.
Id. at 1173-74.
Id. at 1178-79.
Id. at 1173 n.1.
Id. at 1178. One might well question "that capacity for growth and adaptation is the 'peculiar boast and excellence of the common law' . . ...
Id. at 1175-78.
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the application of the expanded rule to other officer-employee
situations. It seems that the court is going to attempt to
gauge the public interest in each case in deciding whether to
apply the expanded rule. The result is likely to be a series of
narrow holdings, some finding incompatibility, others not.
This has created an atmosphere of uncertainty, and it is
likely to have a negative effect upon the discovery of future
candidates for Wyoming offices.
MISAPPLICATION OF THE

RuLP

AGAINST INCOMPATIBILITY

Haskins v. State, ex rel. Harrinto42 is the first case
in which the Wyoming court has ever applied the rule against
incompatible office-holding. 3 The reason that the rule was
so extended here is that it really was not an incompatibility
case. The facts in Haskins indicated that a conflict of interest was involved, and the conflict of interest statute"
should have been allowed to control. Many conflicts of interest stem from the relation of the officer's personal employment to his role as an officer. The mere fact that the
personal employment is in a government field, such as public
education, is no reason to abandon the conflict of interest
approach in favor of the incompatibility concept.
In the Haskins situation, there was clearly a potential
conflict of interest, but this alone will not support a finding
of incompatibility." A conflict of "duties" must be found
if common-law incompatibility is to be invoked. The duties
of the members of the board of trustees are outlined in detail
in WYo. STAT. § 21.1-26.' Clearly a teacher's duties will not
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 1175.
WYO. STAT. § 9-680 (Supp. 1973). See note 30 supra.
Haskins, 8upra note 2, at 1179; Jones v. Kolbeck, supra note 9, at 379.
Haskins, supra note 2, at 1179-80; Reilly v. Ozzard, supra note 9, at 367-70;
WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 49.

47. WYo. STAT. § 21.1-26 (Supp. 1973). These duties include:
(a) prescribing rules and regulations for the government of the schools
under the board's jurisdiction;
(b) keeping minutes of meetings and publishing salaries paid;
(c) electing board officers;
(e) submitting financial reports to the state board;
(f) estimating a budget;
(g) controlling and dispersing moneys;
(i) obtaining competitive bids for construction and improvements; and,
(n) considering petitions presented by the citizens of the school district.
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conflict with those specified. In addition, the teacher will be
able to offer invaluable information and a measure of expertise on matters involving the actual operation of the schools.
Because the board will necessarily deal with teacher's
contracts and working conditions, conflicts of interest are
certain to occur with a teacher on the board. WYo. STAT. § 9-

6804" was enacted by the legislature to deal with just this
type of problem. With the conflict of interest statute so
readily at hand, it might be asked why the court by-passed it
to get to an inapplicable common-law rule, which had to be
revamped in order to make it apply in the case.49
THE "INTOLERABLE

CONFLICT OF INTEREST" PROBLEM

Apparently the court was convinced of the soundness of
the policy arguments made, and the results reached, in teachertrustee cases in New Jersey 0 and Kentucky. 5' In Visoteky v.
City Council of the City of Garfield 2 and Knuckles v. Board
of Education of Bell County,53 courts of those states declared
the "position" of teacher to be incompatible with the "office" of board member, although the holdings were based on
statute,54 rather than the common-law rule. In citing those
48. WYO. STAT. § 9-680 (Supp. 1973). See note 30 supra.
49. Mr. Justice McEwan's concurring opinion brought up one potential problem
with the conflict of interest approach. He pointed out the fact that there
is no statutory limit to the number of teachers who could be elected to a
board. Because WYo. STAT. § 21.1-21 (Supp. 1973) requires the vote of a
majority of the trustees elected for effective board action, no action could
be taken on teacher contracts if a majority of the board were teachers.
Haskins, supra note 2, at 1181. If the possibility of this problem became
real enough, the legislature could easily solve it by limiting the number of
teachers who could be elected to a board.
50. Visotcky v. City Council of the City of Garfield, 113 N.J. Super. 263, 273
A.2d 597 (1971). The court in Haskins spends a good deal of time examining the development of common-law incompatibility in New Jersey, where
a healthy disrespect for the office/position distinction has developed. See
Reilly v. Ozzard supra, note 9, at 366; Ahto v. Weaver, 39 N.J. 418, 189
A.2d 27 (1963); and Glasser, supra note 16, at 504. In spite of the developing criticism, the New Jersey courts have limited their attack to areas
where New Jersey statutes authorize the finding of incompatibility between an "office" and a "position."
51. Knuckles v. Bd. of Educ. of Bell County, 272 Ky. 431, 114 S.W.2d 511 (Ct.
App. 1938).
52. Visoteky v. City Council of the City of Garfield, supra note 50.
53. Knuckles v. Bd. of Educ. of Bell County, supra note 51.
54. N.J.S.A. § 18A:12-2 (1968). "No member of any board of education shall
be interested directly or indirectly in any contract with or claim against
the board." The court in Visoteky v. City Council of the City of Garfield,
supra note 50, at 599, read this section in conjunction with N.J.S.A. § 18A:
12-1, as establishing the qualifications for holding office on the board.
KY. REV. STAT § 61.090 (1971). "The acceptance by one (1) in office of
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cases, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court neglected to
mention that they were brought under, and decided under,
the applicable statutes.
The New Jersey Superior Court spoke of the problem
quite fittingly in terms of "intolerable potential conflicts
of interest. '"" The Wyoming Supreme Court obviously felt
that Haskin's election to the board presented an "intolerable
conflict of interest." The Wyoming statute" on conflict of
interest did not do what the court wanted done here, which
was simply to declare that a teacher could not serve on the
board of trustees. As a result, the common-law rule against
incompatible offices was invoked, changed drastically, and
then limited to the facts of the case.
If this and other conflict of interest situations involving public employment are so "intolerable," then the legisature should take some action. Both incompatibility and
confict of interest principles are based on sound public policy.
The specific details of the policy, however, should be mapped
out by the legislature. In Haskins, because of the statutory
void, the court was forced to legislate on a narrow point. The
shift of legislative duties to the judiciary is not becoming of
either body, at least if what we see in Haskins is representative of the results.
Prior to the Haskins case, the conflict of interest statutes 7 and the incompatibility rule must have seemed quite
effective within the spheres in which they operated. The
Haskims case indicates, however, that there is an area where
the distinction between the two becomes blurred, an area involving "intolerable conflicts of interest." Although legislation would be appropriate in regards to the qualifications
and restrictions on candidates for any office, it is particularly appropriate in this area of "intolerable conflict of interest." This area includes all those situations where it is
another office or employment incompatible with the one (1) he holds shall
operate to vacate the first." This section was formerly KY. STAT § 3744
(Caroll 1936), under which Knuckle8 v. Bd. of Eduo. of Bell County, supra
note 51, was decided.
55. Visotcky v. City Council of the City of Garfield, supra note 50, at 599.
56. Wyo. STAT. § 9-680 (Supp. 1973). See note 30 supra
57. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-178 and 9-680 (Supp. 1973).
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deemed proper to declare that certain public employees are
ineligible to run for certain specific offices, because the particular conflicts of interest would be so great, or would occur
with such regularity, that the present conflict of interest
statutes are inadequate to protect the public interest. The
alternative is to allow, or possibly force, the court to legislate the public interest here on a case-by-case basis, utilizing
the newly-extended common-law incompatibility rule. The
problem with the judicial approach is that it would take
many years in Wyoming to develop a line of cases sufficiently limiting the now uncertain applicability of the rule
established in Haskins.
It may be argued that the proper result was reached by
the Wyoming Supreme Court in Haskins v. State, ex rel.
8 What must be conceded, however, is that deterHarrington."
mination of restrictions on office-holding ultimately belongs
within the jurisdiction of the legislature, and that statutory
resolution of the questions involved would result in much less
uncertainty than we now have. In these times of sophisticated and costly election campaigns, such uncertainty could
well have a deterrent effect upon conscientious citizens considering public service. It is therefore imperative that the
legislature remove this uncertainty by appropriate legislation.
ANDREW BISSONNETTE

58. Haskins, supra note 2.
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